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FINAL DRAFT 
 
 
THE COLOR OF TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM 
 
Kevin Noble Maillard* 
Syracuse University 
 
 
Wills that prioritize the interests of nontraditional families over collateral 
heirs test courts’ dedication to observing the posthumous wishes of testators. 
Collateral heirs who object to will provisions that redraw the contours of 
“family” are likely to profit from the incompatibility of testamentary freedom 
and social deviance. Thus, the interests of married, white adults may claim 
priority over nonwhite, unmarried others. Wills that acknowledge the 
existence of moral or social transgressions—namely, interracial sex and 
reproduction—incite will contests by collateral heirs who leverage their status 
as white and legitimate in order to defeat testamentary intent. 
 
This Article turns to antebellum and postwar will contests between 
disinherited white heirs and mixed-race devisees to question the role of courts 
in defining “family” and the expectancy of collaterals to uphold this 
limitation. While other studies have separately examined the myth of 
testamentary freedom and argued for the legitimacy of diverse families, 
scholars have paid less attention to the color of inheritance.  Drawing on 
Cheryl Harris’s groundbreaking work on property and racial expectation 
interests, this Article illustrates the centrality of whiteness in the validation of 
testamentary transfers.  At the same time, it questions the legal resistance to 
nontraditional families, which substantially weakens the aspirational theory 
of donative freedom—the cornerstone of Trusts & Estates. Through the 
intersection of wills law and family law, this Article initiates a critical 
inquiry of the influence of race in testamentary transfers. 
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3  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Death is a tragedy, but its aftermath can be a drama. Will 
contests over race, sexuality, and legitimacy unearth silent 
judgments1 about the meaning of family2 and the expectations3 
created in kinship, which incites a legal articulation of the color of 
testamentary freedom.  Families mourn the decedent, and if the will 
jettisons normative ideas and expectations about family and kinship4, 
the collateral heirs may contest the estate envisioned by the testator 
as the last will and testament.  Selective attention paid to the 
testator’s intent reveals a paradoxical contingency of testamentary 
freedom, that core legal tenet of “do what he wills with his own.”5  
                                                     
* Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law.  I would like to 
thank Don Herzog and Anita Allen for their thorough comments, and to various 
faculty colloquia and conferences at New York Law School, Seton Hall University, 
and the Syracuse University College of Law Junior Faculty Forum.  A heartfelt 
thanks to Sonia Katyal for her perspicacity and professionalism, and Anita 
Krishnakumar, Josh Tate, Rose Villazor, and Melynda Price.  Parts of this research 
could not have been completed without the help of the O’Neill family of 
Charleston, the Avery Center for African American History and Culture, and the 
Charleston Historical Society.  Special thank you to Rachel Godsil and Annette 
Gordon-Reed for their elegant insight. 
1 For a through discussion of lawsuits over dispositions considered “unjust” or 
“unnatural,” see Susanna L. Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: Policing the Bounds of 
Testamentary Freedom in Nineteenth Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 960 (2006) 
(hereinafter BLUMENTHAL).  
2 James Hugo Johnston accumulated a number of these family disputes from the 
antebellum era in his book, RACE RELATIONS IN VIRGINIA AND MISCEGENATION 
IN THE SOUTH, 1776-1860 (1970).  
3 Testamentary disagreements are recorded as early as Blackstone, who argued that 
biological children received no automatic bounty in their parents’ estate. 2 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (“The right of inheritance, or deficient to 
the children and relations of the deceased, feems to have been allowed much 
earlier than the right of devifing by teftament. We are apt to conceive at firft view 
that it has nature on it's fide; yet we often miftake for nature what we find 
eftablifhed by long and inveterate cuftom.”) 
4 Modern courts have strayed from basing family court decisions, namely custody 
battles, on private biases. See, Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (ruling 
that private biases and the possible injury they might inflict are impermissible 
considerations for removal of a white child from the custody of its natural mother 
who remarried a man of a different race). 
5 See, BLUMENTHAL at 963 (characterizing testamentary freedom as part of the 
Scottish Common Sense tradition)  
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4  
Courts join in this jurisprudential melody that celebrates the 
American ideological duet of liberty and freedom, yet statuses of 
race6, sexuality7, and marriage8 potentially curtail this posthumous 
wish.9  Historically, representations of testamentary diversity—the 
after-death interests of nontraditional “family” over the unnamed 
interests of collateral heirs test courts’ dedication to observing the 
unorthodox wishes of testators.  Concomitantly, transfers with white, 
legitimate devisees as the objects of testamentary intent routinely 
passed. When pitted against an issue of a moral or social 
transgression10, testamentary intent fails.11     
                                                     
6 See generally, R. A. Lenhardt. Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, 
and the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 843 (2008) (arguing that 
state-imposed obstacles to marriage have affected citizen rights) Florence Wagman 
Roisman, The Impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on Racially Discriminatory Donative 
Transfers, 53 ALA. L. REV. 463 (2002) (exploring the effect of the 1866 Civil Rights 
Act to donative transfers).  See also, Estate of Monks, 48 Cal. App. 2d 603 (Cal. 
App. 1941) (declaring surviving spouse as ineligible to inherit because interracial 
marriage was void); Succession of Filhiol, 119 La. 998 (La. 1907) (voiding 
interracial transfer as against public policy). 
7 See, In re Estate of Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128 (1993) (rejecting the right of election 
against decedent’s will in regards to same-sex marriage); In Re Kaufmann’s Will, 
205 N.E.2d 864 (1965) (claiming undue influence of gay life partner on testator).  
See also, Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 225 (1981). 
8 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (declaring unconstitutional an Illinois 
statute prohibiting a nonmarital child from inheriting from its biological father).  
9 Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. 84, 87 
(1994) (calling for a change in inheritance laws to reflect the changing American 
family). 
10 See, BLUMENTHAL at 960.  See also, Dees v. Metts, 17 So.2d 137 (Ala. 1944) 
(describing a white man who left property to a black woman as “sinful”).  Wills 
involving same-sex partners also incite morality battles by disgruntled biological 
family members.  See also, Amy Ronner, Homophobia: In the Closet and in the Coffin,  21 
LAW & INEQ. J. 65, 73 (2003) (“the will contest becomes a device for righting the 
wrong, for ousting the villainous converter, and for reassembling the broken 
family”) 
11 Courts have served as repositories of moral sentiment in regards to protecting 
disinherited family members.  A number of scholars have addressed this issue with 
a call for more inclusive approaches to donative transfers.  See generally, Gary 
Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian 
Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. 275 (1999) 
(championing “considers testator-compelled arbitration as a means for overcoming 
the Trier of fact's propensity to invalidate any estate plan that does not conform to 
majoritarian cultural norms”); Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law 
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This Article criticizes the doctrine of testamentary intent 
through an historical analysis of an antebellum interracial will 
contest as a paradigmatic example of the color of testamentary 
freedom.  Other studies have explored the juridical anomalies of 
interracial will disputes, but have remained silent on the inherent 
pairing of wealth and whiteness in transfers of property.12  Will 
transfers that cross color lines directly challenge donative freedom by 
asking courts to eschew social norms in favor of the testator’s intent.  
Testators who eschewed traditional devises to spouses, relatives, and 
institutions in favor of mistresses, slaves13, or both often incited will 
contests that succeeded in overturning their deviant will.14  Building 
upon Cheryl Harris’s concept of racialized expectancies in property 
theory, my research shows that white collateral heirs, in both a first 
and last resort, leveraged whiteness to contest wills that consciously 
excluded them.15  In the eyes of the state, probating an interracial will 
that requests an acknowledgement of forbidden love16 and its 
                                                     
and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063 (1999) (considering the 
merits of same-sex inclusion within intestacy law); Melanie Leslie, The Myth of 
Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (1996) (examining courts’ employment 
of moral values in wills law) (hereinafter “LESLIE”); Al Brophy, Teaching the Race of 
Testamentary Freedom (unpublished paper on file with author, 2005) (addressing the 
effects of gender and race on testamentary freedom).  
12 See Jason Gillmer, Suing For Freedom: Interracial Sex, Slave Law, and Racial Identity in 
the Post-Revolutionary and Antebellum South, 82 N.C.L. Rev. 535, 597 (2004) 
(addressing the rights of mixed-race slaves who sued for their freedom). See also, 
Bernie Jones, Righteous Fathers,” “Vulnerable Old Men,” and “Degraded Creatures”: 
Southern Justices on Miscegenation in the Antebellum Will Contest, 40 TULSA L. REV. 699 
(2005) (using interracial will contests to analyze the attitudes of antebellum jurists 
towards interracialism). 
13 Id.  
14 BLUMENTHAL at 964.  
15 Adrienne Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 221, 264 (1999) (hereinafter DAVIS) (describing will challenges 
initiated by white collateral heirs).  
16 Mary Boykin Chesnut’s diary reveals the conflict between public oblivion and 
private knowledge of the interracial sexuality of the slave system: 
God forgive us, but ours is a monstrous system and wrong and 
iniquity....Like the patriarchs of old our men live all in one house with 
their wives and their concubines, and the mulattoes one sees in every 
family exactly resemble the white children - and every lady tells you who 
is the father of all the mulatto children in everybody's household, but 
those in her own she seems to think drop from the clouds… 
DAVIS, supra note 15 at fn 286.  
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outcomes not only diminishes the authority of the law, but it also 
contradicts statutory intent.17  State-sanctioned racial supremacy 
generates no surprises in the antebellum South, but its overwhelming 
persistence in blatant opposition to the language of the will clearly 
illustrates the central and tragic fallacy of testamentary intent.18   
A surprising gap in the legal literature demonstrates a failure 
to contemplate race in wills as a presumptive indicator of family 
membership.19  While studies have separately examined the myth of 
testamentary freedom20, testamentary incapacity in interracial 
transfers21 and the legitimacy of diverse families22, scholars have paid 
less attention to the triangulation of race, marriage, and property as 
indices of the legal parameters of kinship.  This Article sharply 
denounces the expectation interest23 created by these norms that 
facilitate the provenance of racial supremacy and marital privilege to 
exclude nontraditional family forms.  Statutory schemes remain 
underinclusive24, as they may not provide legal protection for those 
infinitely diverse articulations of family and association25 that exist 
beyond the comprehension and acceptance of the law.26  By 
determining who stands eligible to inherit, wills law constructs a 
property interest in legitimacy that inherently discredits, discounts, 
and ultimately exposes the success of testamentary intent as 
contingent on social conformity.27   
                                                     
17 Gillmer, infra note 87 at 39. 
18 See LESLIE, supra note 11 at 236 (refuting the “oft-repeated axiom that 
testamentary freedom is the polestar of wills law”).  
19 Professor Blumenthal has also written on deviance in wills, particularly 
interracial transfers of property.  Her article differs because it focuses more on the 
psychological aspects of wills law than the limits of testamentary freedom). 
20 See generally, LESLIE. 
21 See generally, BLUMENTHAL.  
22 See generally, Spitko, supra  note 11.  
23 HARRIS at 1729-31. 
24 JENS BECKERT, INHERITED WEALTH 111 (2007) (“The internal diversification of 
the model of the conjugal family.”) 
25 See note 13.  
26 See supra note 11. 
27 The status of family can outweigh the actual nature of relationships.  Blood ties, 
however remote, may trump the interest of a long-term, live-in, but nonmarital 
domestic partner who is not a legal spouse.  Frances Foster, The Family Paradigm Of 
Inheritance Law, 80 N.C.L. REV. 199 (2001) (explaining that “family paradigm prizes 
status above need, desert, or affection”). 
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This Article turns to history in order to examine the direct 
link between property, race, and sex.  The records for this case 
remained untouched in Charleston, South Carolina, for 137 years.28  
The records include motions, opinions, and personal 
correspondence—all written by hand in calligraphic style.  I focus on 
an interracial will dispute in South Carolina that straddled the end of 
the Civil War and the closing of the slave regime.  In this case, white 
collateral heirs contested the will of their brother, Paul Durbin 
Remley, who had devised his estate to his slave mistress and their 
two children.  In this same devise, the testator disinherited his white 
relatives, exercising his belief in testamentary freedom.  By thinking 
of this mixed-race family as “deviant,” the white, legally legitimate  
Remleys, in clear opposition to the donative intent, reap the benefits 
of the color of testamentary freedom.  
This historical account of an interracial will dispute retains 
timeless value in its demonstration of the conflict of testamentary 
freedom and race.  Section One discusses the inherent testamentary 
privilege of whiteness.  By looking at antimiscegenation law as a 
deterrent for the interracial transmission of property, the state’s 
support of a normative idea of the family becomes clear.  A 
presumption of illegitimacy existed for interracial families, which 
sharply curtailed the survivor’s rights to inherit.  In the following 
section, I introduce the case of Mary Remley, a white widow 
accused of being a black slave.  In the challenge to this claim, which 
threatened her children’s inheritance of their father’s will, an 
unintended relative asserts her status as a free white woman.  This 
will contest not only demonstrates the legal power of whiteness, but 
it also underscores that privilege by resisting erroneous assaults on 
racial identity.  This allows whites to exclude the legal expectancies 
and pecuniary interests of other whites, as long as their whiteness 
remains valid.   The last Section looks at the younger Remley son’s 
bequest to a black slave and their two children.  In this conflict, race 
shifts from a disqualifier to an indicator of the limits of family.  
Finally, I conclude that racial and familial constructions that defy 
social norms challenge the aspirational concept of testamentary 
freedom, which ultimately reveals an inherent weakness in the 
cornerstone of wills law.    
 
                                                     
28 South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston, SC, Paul Remley Estate Case 
Records, 1861-1867. 
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8  
I. Inherent Privilege
 
Will contests force an intersectional analysis of family law 
and secession law by forcing private issues of deviance into the 
public realm.29  In constructing laws to protect kinfolk from unjust 
disinheritance by testators, these safeguards reflexively exclude 
parties who fall outside the juridical conception of family.30  On one 
hand, statutory schemes protect vulnerable family members from 
predictable patterns of disinheritance31 that disfavor neglected 
spouses32 and nonmarital, nonbiological children.33  Spouses may not 
disinherit each other34, and in most states, nonmarital children35 have 
the same rights as marital children.36  At the same time, these 
protections may completely contradict the testamentary intent of the 
decedent by directing property away from intended devisees into the 
                                                     
29 BLUMENTHAL at 966.  
30 Intestacy statutes approximate what the decedent would have wanted in the 
absence of a will.  These statutory constructions of family prioritize biological over 
chosen family.  NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: 
VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 186 (2008).  See also, Susan Gary, 
Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 Law & Ineq. J. 1 (2000) (“intestacy 
laws still reflect the nuclear family norm”).  
31 Blood relations are deemed so important by courts that distant relatives can have 
stronger claims over a decedent’s estate than a domestic partner.  The specter of 
the “laughing heir” looms large as a preventative doctrine, yet these testamentary 
safeguards baselessly privilege biological family over chosen family, which allows 
collateral heirs to reap the benefits of legal legitimacy.  The Uniform Probate Code 
has taken measures to limit the scope of succession, which prohibits inheritance 
beyond grandparents and their descendants. UPC §2-103.  See also David F. 
Cavers, Change in the American Family and the "Laughing Heir,” 20 IOWA L. REV. 203, 
208 (1935) (predicting the change in law). 
32 The Uniform Probate Code allows for spouses who were left out of a premarital 
will to recover the same amount as an intestate share, with some exceptions. UPC 
§2-301. Additionally, all spouses displeased with their share in a will may opt for an 
elective share, depending on the length of the marriage. UPC §2-202. 
33 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).   
34 Forty nine states (except Georgia) give the surviving spouse some right in the 
estate of the decedent.  UPC §2-221. 
35 However, adopted children have the same testamentary rights as biological 
children.  See, Susan Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & 
INEQ. J. 1 (2000) (examining rights of adopted children); Jan E. Rein, Relatives by 
Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and Why?, 37 VAND. L. REV. 
711 (1984) (examining treatment of adopted children in succession laws). 
36 Supra note 8. 
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2  
hands of “approved,” legally legitimate family that the decedent 
entirely wished to circumvent.37  This presumption favoring 
legitimacy entirely devalues the cornerstone of wills law, 
testamentary intent, by imposing an unwanted statutory construction 
of family38 that eclipses the decedent’s subjective definition which 
deviates from the state’s and society’s norms of kinship.39  
The idea of the “changing American family”40 perpetually 
fluctuates, with the only constant aspect being the law’s recognition 
of a limited version.41  Marriage has long stood as the unifying 
characteristic of family, yet this venerable institution has been subject 
to state control.42  Concomitant with regulation of marriage is the 
regulation of property transmission, and stringent controls on who 
                                                     
37 At common law, courts went to extreme lengths to ascertain blood relatives of 
persons who died intestate.  In a 1953 Philadelphia case involving a $17,000,000 
estate, 26,000 potential heirs asserted claims to the estate.  The court opined, 
“some persons still sincerely believe that they are entitled to her estate as next of 
kin and cannot understand how any Court can fail to recognize their close 
relationship to their dear and treasured Henrietta whom they never saw or knew 
but of whom they have recently become so fond.” In re Garrett's Estate, 94 A.2d 
357, 358-9 (Pa. 1953) (cited in Frances Foster, The Family Paradigm of Family Law, 80 
N.C.L. REV. 199, n217 (2001).  
38 The meaning of “family” in wills law offers a presumption strongly in favor of 
the nuclear family. Beneficiaries outside this protected circle must rebut this 
presumption in order to inherit. See Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession 
Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063 (1999) (citing 
Professor Fellow’s argument that intestacy law favors the nuclear family). 
39 Id. Ralph Brashier offers a comprehensive examination of diverse families and 
the problems they face with inheritance.  See, R. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW 
AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY (2004). 
40 A number of scholars have engaged this term to describe the challenge of law to 
embrace difference rather than imposing uniformity and penalizing diversity.  See 
Foster, Family Paradigm at 201; Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws at 4, 58.  One scholar 
argues that modern families have eclipsed the specter of 1950’s nuclear television 
families.  Thomas Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for Domestic Partners, 79 TUL. L. REV. 
55, 58.  
41 See, ANITA BERNSTEIN, MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL 
STATUS (2005).  
42 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 
(recognizing that marriage is subject to State police power, but not unlimited); 
Cleveland v. U.S.  329 U.S. 14 (1946) (regulation of marriage is a state matter); See, 
DAVIS infra note 15 at fn15.  See also, MILTON REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: 
LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE (1999). 
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3  
can get married necessarily dictates, in turn, who may inherit.43  
Regulation has prevented people of the same sex44 from legal 
consolidation of their interests, as well as interracial couples,45 
related people,46 minors,47 and slaves.48  Relationships that fit the 
state’s conception of appropriate prospective spouses receive state 
protection of their relationship and of their property.49  For those 
relationships existing outside of this realm of approval, securing 
these same rights proves a remarkably difficult process.50 
                                                     
43 See generally, Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993) 
(hereinafter HARRIS) (arguing that property is a form of racialized privilege).  
44 Today, gay and lesbian partners, in addition to heterosexual nonmarital partners, 
must overcome a presumption of nonaffiliation to decedents who die intestate.  
David Chambers, What If: The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of 
lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447 (1996) (discussing the rights of 
gays and lesbians under intestacy laws).  
45 Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967) (holding unconstitutional a state statue 
prohibiting interracial marriages).  Despite the Supreme Court’s 1967 ruling, 
Alabama formally held on to antimiscegenation law until the year 2000. Kevin 
Johnson, Taking The “Garbage” Out in Tulia, Texas: The Taboo on Black-White Romance 
and Racial Profiling in the “War on Drugs”, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 283, 300 (2007) (citing 
Alabama’s statute as an example of the lingering taboo of interracial relations). 
46 Singh v. Singh, 213 Conn. 637 (1990) (voiding a marriage between a half-uncle 
and a half-niece). 
47 Moe V. Dinkins 533 F.Supp 623 (1982).  See also, Lynn Wardle, Rethinking 
Marital Age Restrictions, 21 J. FAM. L. 1 (1983).  
48 See, DAVIS, infra note 15 at fn 9. Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner's Truth: Race, 
Gender, and the Institution of Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309, 330-31 (1996) 
(summarizing effects of enslavement on inheritance). 
49 See, Brashier, supra note 39 at 3.  For the majority of people who die without a 
will, the laws of intestacy approximate the decedent’s presumed intent, which fails 
to incorporate diverse family structures. Ronald Scalise Jr., Honor Thy Father and 
Mother?: How Intestacy Law Goes Too Far in Protecting Parents, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 
171, 172 (2006). (“intestacy laws are important because they embody the collective 
judgment of a society as to how an individual's property should devolve in the 
absence of an expression by the decedent”).  
50 Upholding community standards and social norms in blatant conflict with 
testamentary intent not only institutionalizes and rewards discrimination in wills 
law, but it also unfairly discourages settlors to provide for their chosen family.  
Testators who eschewed traditional devises to spouses, relatives, and institutions in 
favor of mistresses, slaves, or both often incited will contests of testamentary 
incapacity, undue influence, or fraud.  BLUMENTHAL at 964.  Professor Foster has 
argued for the intangible benefits of wills, which include sentimental recognition of 
the survivor’s importance to the decedent.  Frances Foster, The Family Paradigm Of 
Inheritance Law, 80 N.C.L. REV. 199 (2001) (arguing that maintaining ownership and 
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Testamentary language indeed articulates a decedent’s 
subjective interpretation of family, but nontraditional estate plans 
may confront a restrictive statutory scheme that bases kinship on 
traditional legal and social expectations.51  In most cases, wills pass 
quickly though probate because few challenges exist to slow and 
lengthen the probate process. Few legal barriers prevent a civil 
spouse and children from being considered as legitimate family 
members.52  It is the rarer and more diverse conceptions of family 
that must overcome a presumption of illegitimacy53, even when the 
words of the testamentary document clearly indicate the familial role 
played by the disenfranchised.54  Despite the clarity of intent, 
balancing the state’s interest in the efficient distribution of property 
with the testator’s legal interest in bequeathing directly challenges the 
efficient meaning of “family.”  This reveals an under examined 
aspect of not only the privileged status gained from marriage, but 
also the governmental regulation of diverse expressions of family.55  
Married people’s relationships receive state protection, while deviant 
families suffer in the disruptive wake of unfounded testamentary 
entitlement.  The collision of these interests clearly highlights the 
                                                     
connection to the decedent’s property “ensure[s] a continued connection with a 
deceased loved one.”).  Additionally, Professor Spitko has noted that testamentary 
freedom encourages testators to freely distribute property, Spitko, Conforming, 
supra note 11. 
51 LESLIE at 238 (discussing courts’ commitment to seeing that testators uphold a 
duty to family.) 
52 See, Jennifer Tulin McGrath, The Ethical Responsibilities of Estate Planning Attorneys 
in the Representation of Non-Traditional Couples, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 75, (2003) 
(explaining the legal formation of traditional, nuclear, heterosexual families); 
Foster, infra note 27 at n2 (pointing out the mythical stereotype of the traditional 
nuclear family).  See also, Spitko, Nonmarital, supra  note 7 at 1102 (stating that 
intestacy law reflects societal understandings of family which privileges 
heterosexual marriage).  
53 Kevin Noble Maillard, The Multiracial Epiphany, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2709 
(2008) (describing the default legal and social approach of illegitimacy and/or 
improbability of interracial families and relationships). 
54 LESLIE at 236.  
55 Diverse expressions of family—unmarried heterosexual couples and also 
homosexual couples—find that their expressions of commitment fail to receive the 
same easy protections of the heteronormative nuclear family.  See Laura 
Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227 
(2005) (exploring inheritance law as an example of state’s views on marriage and 
gender roles).  
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difference between statutory constructions of family and heirship and 
the subjective representations articulated by the decedent.56   
                                                     
56 This concept describes the ability of testators to direct behavior after their death 
by setting requirements on devisees in order to inherit.  See, Shapira v. Union Nat. 
Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 827-28 (Ohio Com.Pl. 1974). 
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A. (Il)legitimacy Explained 
 
Testamentary freedom hinges upon the racial identity of the 
beneficiary.  Common law dictates eligibility to inherit by declaring 
heirs as either legitimate or illegitimate.57  A legitimate heir stands as 
a biological descendant, born to married parents, and held out by the 
decedent as his child, thus placing the descendant within a protected 
class of devisees.58  Children born within state sanctioned conjugal 
relationships59 rest upon the legal privilege conferred by their parents’ 
marriage.60  Conversely, a child born to unmarried parents held the 
status of illegitimate and was not legally recognized as the decedent’s 
natural child.61  This exclusion from legal protection not only 
demonstrates a preference for married households, but it also refuses 
to define family outside of a nuclear, male-female, marital dyad.  
Legal access to the decedent’s estate—and the strength of that 
claim—increased according to the state’s conception of the approved 
family.  
                                                     
57 Blackstone characterizes bastardy, or illegitimacy, as a child without “inheritable 
blood.”  This status came from the child having parents not married at the time of 
his/her birth.  Blackstone’s Commentaries 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/blackstone/bk2ch15.htm (“are such 
children as are not born either in lawful wedlock, or within a competent time after 
it's determination”).   
58 JENS BECKERT, INHERITED WEALTH (2007).  
59 Conjugal relationships normally signify marriage, although same-sex and 
different-sex cohabitants are also included.  Canada has taken steps to expand the 
meaning of family “beyond” conjugality to include adults living alone, sibling 
pairings, and platonic cohabitating adults.  See, Law Commission of Canada, 
Beyond Conjugality Report (2001), available at 
http://www.samesexmarriage.ca/docs/beyond_conjugality.pdf. 
60 Intestacy law upholding the exclusion of illegitimate children if there are martial 
children has been deemed constitutional. Id. At 106.  
61 In wills law, preventative measures dictate minimum requirements for estate 
distribution, despite testamentary intent. LESLIE at 269 (elective share statutes, 
which curtail "the decedent's testamentary freedom with respect to his or her title-
based ownership interests... No matter what the decedent's intent.”)  The 
inheritance interests of legitimate family members traditionally trumped those of 
enumerated illegitimate counterparts, although modern reforms have given 
nonmarital children additional rights. Beckert, supra note 24 at 105.  Yet 
traditionally, law created a hierarchy of testamentary interests that did not interpret 
devises to nonmarital children as viable transfers of property.  Id. at 104. 
KEVIN NOBLE MAILLARD (SYRACUSE) 
Color of Testamentary Freedom 
 
7  
Children and partners living within non-nuclear, nonmarital 
households have traditionally fallen short of the benchmark of 
protection in comparison to legally legitimate parties who already 
enjoy the security of the law.  In the wake of protecting legitimate 
family members, those outside this sphere of recognized kinship 
remain vulnerable to being divested of their legal rights.62  Indeed, 
legitimacy has its merits by protecting survivors of the decedent from 
disinheritance and pecuniary neglect.63  Intestacy and elective shares 
ensure that spouses and children retain a state-sanctioned share of 
the decedent’s estate.64  These protective schemes also have a 
preventative efficacy by ensuring that external parties have no greater 
claims on the estate than do the legitimate family.65  
For those who could not marry, legitimacy remained an 
elusive status that excluded all nontraditional couples and families.  
States with antimiscegenation laws did not entertain the legal 
possibility of an interracial family.66  And all states, until recently67 
did not recognize same sex marriages.68  In both of these exclusions, 
race and sexuality intersect to pose legitimate questions about the 
fiction of testamentary freedom.69  If adhesions to “legitimacy” 
supersede the wishes of the testator, external norms of family 
construction and kinship eclipse any subjective posthumous wish to 
                                                     
62 Spitko, supra note 11 at 1098. 
63 Foster, supra note 50 at n84 (citing Via v. Putnam, 656 So. 2d 460, 466 (Fla. 
1995)). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Maillard, supra  note 39 at 2712.  DAVIS at 231, 268. 
67 California and Massachusetts grant same-sex couples the right to marry.  New 
York recognizes same sex marriages performed outside of New York.  In re 
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (holding that limiting marriage to 
heterosexual couples denied gay couples of equal protection); Martinez v. County 
of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (recognizing all forms of 
foreign marriage, including same sex);  Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (granting same-sex couples equal rights to marriage as 
provided in the state constitution). Vermont, New Jersey, Connecticut, and New 
Hampshire have granted same-sex couples the same right as different-sex married 
couples, but these legal unions have not been classified as “marriage.”  Baker v. 
State, 170 Vt. 194; 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 
2006). 
68 Id.  
69 LESLIE at 236.  (“the oft-repeated axiom that testamentary freedom is the 
polestar of wills law”).   
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provide for an intended70 rather than (or in addition to) a legal 
family.  Testamentary freedom is heavily contingent on legal 
permissiveness rather than the actual, biological, or conjugal 
relationship between decedent and devisee.  In order to confer rights 
on the relation, a legally recognized relationship must exist.  Law, as 
a filer of efficiency71, selectively casts its legitimizing gaze.  
 
B. Racializing Legitimacy 
 
Antimiscegenation statutes curtailed the transfer of property 
across racial lines.  By declaring marriages between blacks and 
whites illegal, law thwarted a secure interest of black and mulatto 
beneficiaries in the estates of white testators.  Without the protective 
status that marriage confers, courts viewed interracial families as 
inherently illegitimate, which opened estates to the rapacious 
strategies of white collateral heirs.  The reliability of antimiscegenist 
amnesia, that is, the narrative that the interracial family does not 
legally exist, fueled the redirection of testamentary intent.  With the 
law favoring coverage of legitimate kin over illegitimate relations, 
white collaterals expected courts to supplant the beneficiaries’ named 
interests in favor of themselves.  The racial identity of the 
beneficiaries stimulated traditional grounds for objecting to a will: 
incapacity, undue influence, and fraud.72   
Miscegenation existed as a public secret in each of the slave 
states.  The legal derecognition of formal interracial relationships 
belies the reality of their widespread existence.  In his comprehensive 
study on American mulattoes, Joel Williamson comments, “it is safe 
to assume that the lines of lust in the old South ran continually and 
in all directions.”  The concubinage of black women by white men 
formed the majority of interracial relations, although unions between 
black men and white women were not unknown.73  A northern 
                                                     
70 Tanya K. Hernandez, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 1014 (1999) 
(“state legislatures can go even further in functionally recognizing families of 
choice).  
71 Bruce Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1033 (1994) (debating the social utilities of probate efficiency). 
72 BLUMENTHAL at 961.  
73 Although this aspect of miscegenation deserves mention, it goes beyond the 
scope of this project.  For a comprehensive examination of this nexus of race and 
gender, see MARTHA HODES, WHITE WOMEN, BLACK MEN, infra note 138.  I am 
primarily concerned with the darkening of wealth, that is, mulatto inheritance from 
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traveler in South Carolina commented, “The enjoyment of a Negro 
or mulatto woman is spoken of as quite a common thing; no 
reluctance, delicacy, or shame is made about the matter.”74  Despite 
individual and cultural narratives asserting such liaisons through 
informed channels, state marriage laws upheld rigid distinctions 
between racial groups.75 
Not all states prohibited interracial marriage.76  In the deep South, 
South Carolina did not prohibit interracial marriage until after the 
Civil War and in Charleston occasional marriages occurred between 
persons of color and well-regarded whites.77  The state suspended the 
prohibition in 1868, only to reenact it in 1879.78  Although Loving v. 
Virginia79 rendered all antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional, the 
state retained the law in its books until 1999.80 
Antebellum miscegenation confounds our collective 
understanding of racial boundaries and sexual desire.  Close 
proximity of blacks and whites in shared spaces81 during and 
immediately after the slave era facilitated sexual availability.82 Yet 
                                                     
white kin, which concerns the transfer of property from white men to mixed race 
offspring.  See also ROBERT J. SICKELS, RACE, MARRIAGE, AND LAW 16-19 
(Albuquerque 1972) (explaining sexual stereotypes of black men and white 
women).  
74 WINTHROP JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD 
THE NEGRO, 1550-1812, 145 (1968). 
75 State statutes, such as in Alabama, upheld boundaries between black and white 
in an attempt to segregate “the most fundamental unit of society, the family.”  Julie 
Novkov, Racial Constructions: The Legal Regulation of Miscegenation in Alabama, 1890—
1934, 20 Law & Hist. Rev. 225, 226 (2002) 
76 For an interactive map detailing which states restricted interracial couples from 
1662-1967, see http://www.lovingday.org/map.htm.  
77 See, JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE: MISCEGENATION AND MULATTOES IN 
THE UNITED STATES  16 (1995) (“South Carolina was unique among the British 
mainland colonies not only in its blackness and easy mixing but also in that some 
whites positively and publicly defended interracial sex.”) 
78 See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, 
IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 75-6 (2003); PETER WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT 
I LOVE MY WIFE: RACE, MARRIAGE, AND LAW—AN AMERICAN HISTORY 103-4 
(2002). 
79 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
80 S.C. Const. Ann. Art. III, 33 (2003). 
81 See, JOHN MICHAEL VLATCH, BACK OF THE BIG HOUSE: THE ARCHITECTURE 
OF PLANTATION SLAVERY 1-17 (1993). 
82 See, WILLIAMSON, supra  note 70 at  15 (“The great number of slaves gave 
abundant sexual opportunity to white masters and overseers.”) 
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within these connected physical worlds, strict hierarchies existed to 
maintain racial roles and boundaries.83  Jeffersonian perceptions of 
racial difference84 articulated a public disgust for the “oorang-
ootans”85 of the African race, thus equating interracial sex as a form 
of bestiality between free white humans and enslaved black 
animals.86  In dehumanizing blacks as simple mammals incapable of 
sentience, talent, and memory, men leveraged their status as free and 
white to exploit and violate black women.87  This version of history 
survives as the collective understanding of miscegenation: forced, 
asymmetrical, and purely physical.  
On the other hand, a growing body of literature espouses the 
possibility of an alternative narrative for interracial sex88, which 
                                                     
83 See, RACHEL MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY 23 (2001) (“interracial 
relationships were tolerated only insofar as they left norms of racial and sexual 
privilege intact”). 
84 In Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson wrote at length on his “aversion…to the 
mixture of colour in America.”  See, WINTHROP JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK 
467 (1968).  Despite his own personal involvement with a mulatto slave, Sally 
Hemings, Jefferson wrote at length about preferring Indian-white intermixture 
over black-white intermixture, which he viewed as a different interaction of 
species.  
Are not the fine mixtures of red and white, the expressions of every 
passion by greater or less suffusions of colour in the one, preferable to 
that eternal monotony, which reigns in the countenances, that 
immoveable veil of black which covers all the emotions of the other race?  
Add to these, flowing hair, a more elegant symmetry of form, their own 
judgment in favour of the whites, declared by their preference of them, as 
uniformly as is the preference of the Oranootan for the black women 
over those of his own species. 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 See DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, “AR’N’T I A WOMAN?” FEMALE SLAVES IN THE 
PLANTATION SOUTH 29-46 (rev. ed. 1999) (1985), quoted in Jason Gillmer, Base 
Wretches And Black Wenches: A Story Of Sex And Race, Violence And Compassion, During 
Slavery Times, 59 ALA. L. REV. __ (2008). 
88 Interracial relations between free white men and enslaved black women generate 
a host of reactions addressing the nature and/or possibility of consent. Many 
scholars would argue that slave status precludes any form of consent and a loving 
relationship, thus making all liaisons between free men and slave women rape. 
Others may view the relationships as mutually beneficial, with black women 
acceding to these relationships in search of better futures for themselves and their 
children.  Analyzing the consensual possibilities of these relationships goes beyond 
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allows for recognition of diverse racial family forms in the South.89  
Jason Gillmer argues for a more historicized look at interracial sex 
and families from this area, which exposes the complexity and 
nuance of navigating interracial relationships and families in the 
context of African slavery.90  Similar to the case study in this Article, 
Gillmer examines an interracial family in Texas besieged by claims 
of illegitimacy despite the thirty-year relationship between a white 
master and his slave.  By examining both the legal and social 
narratives that surround the marital-like relationship between the 
interracial couple, Gillmer juxtaposes the inherent racial inequality 
of the slave system with the possibility of romantic attraction 
between the races.91  Eliciting this unique but not uncommon case of 
antebellum interracial attraction reveals the practical intricacies of 
human interaction in relation to the legal system that presumed its 
implausibility.92 
The greatest intellectual untility derived from Gillmer’s work is 
the ability to let history tell the story of lived experiences in relation 
to the law.93  In the context of miscegenation, it is a legal fiction to 
say that interracial sex is prohibited and void, but the more difficult 
                                                     
the scope of this article, but I do believe it would be overinclusive and 
anachronistic to forestall a possibility of mutual interracial attraction. See, DAVIS, 
supra note 15 at n10 (citing Eugene Genovese’s analysis of master-slave 
relationships beginning as exploitation and turning into love). 
89 See generally, ANNETTE GORDON-REED, THE HEMINGSES OF MONTICELLO 
(2008); JEFF FORRET, RACE RELATIONS AT THE MARGINS: SLAVES AND POOR 
WHITES IN THE ANTEBELLUM COUNTRYSIDE (2006); CALUDIA SAUNT, BLACK, 
WHITE, INDIAN: RACE AND THE UNMASKING OF AN INDIAN FAMILY (2005); 
CHARLES ROBINSON, DANGEROUS LIAISONS, SEX AND LOVE IN THE 
SEGREGATED SOUTH (2003). 
90 Gillmer, supra note 81 at 5.  
91 Id. at 35.  
92 Local studies of interracial families tell a different story of black-white sexuality 
and romance that confound legal prohibitions against miscegenation. Close 
examinations of individual families reveal stories of mutual intimacies between 
master and slave that give a more complete picture of interracial relations.  These 
historical portraits reveal and give life to the conflict between everyday experience 
and legal regulation.  See, JOSHUA ROTHMAN, NOTORIOUS IN THE 
NEIGHBORHOOD: SEX AND FAMILIES ACROSS THE COLOR LINE IN VIRGINIA, 
1787-1861 (2003); KENT ANDERSON LESLIE, WOMAN OF COLOR, DAUGHTER OF 
PRIVILEGE (Athens, GA, 1995); ADELE LOGAN ALEXANDER, AMBIGUOUS LIVES; 
FREE WOMEN OF COLOR IN RURAL GEORGIA 1789-1879 (1993). 
93 Gillmer, supra note 81 at 5. 
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project is assessing the continuing occurrence of these deviations in 
direct opposition to a legal culture that virtually guaranteed their 
illegitimacy.94  Prohibiting marriage between black and white created 
legal obstructions for formal recognition of these relationships, but it 
did not eradicate the liaisons that occurred outside the legal realm.  
Sex between master and slave went largely unpunished, and in the 
eyes of the law, unrecorded.95  Yet, in the examination of local 
histories, racial rhetoric and separationist doctrine implodes by 
opening a “window into the consciousness of ordinary people.”96 
Perceiving interracial relationships as illegitimate and implausible 
stems from a legal history that privileges the interests of free whites 
over those of black slaves.  In cases of interracial conflict, whites 
relied on the exclusion of blacks, both slave and free, to secure and 
solidify their own legal interests.  Cheryl Harris’s landmark work on 
the social and legal benefits of racial discrimination uncovers the 
“settled expectations of whites built on the privileges and benefits 
produced by white supremacy.”97  Both Harris’s and Gillmer’s work 
address the nature of privilege, but while Gillmer analyzes the 
problem from a grassroots level, Harris depicts a legal system 
inherently skewed toward forwarding the interests of whites.  At this 
macro-level, she forces a reconsideration of unequal racial 
assumptions of property.  Her critical approach to the unquestioned 
racial assumptions of property law forces a necessary reconsideration 
of aperspectivity.   
For Harris, property inherently upholds tenets of racial 
supremacy.98  Starting with a basic premise of ownership—the 
dialectic of possession and exclusion—she constructs a theoretical 
framework that captures the interests, both vested and anticipated, 
from owning property.99  Property defines social relations100 and 
                                                     
94 Almost all states had legal prohibitions against interracial marriage.  See Maillard, 
The Multiracial Epiphany, supra note 53.  
95 Angela Onwuachi-Wilig, A Beautiful Lie: Exploring Rhinelander v. Rhinelander as a 
Formative Lesson on Race, Identity, Marriage, and Family, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2393 (2007) 
(citing Rachel Moran, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY) (“"Sex across the color line was 
commonplace despite its racially ambiguous consequences.  White men enjoyed 
ready and open access to black and mulatto women as a mark of their 
untrammeled freedom and privilege."). 
96 Gillmer, supra note 81 at 5.  
97 Harris at 281. 
98 Id. at 1731.  
99 Id.   
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creates expectations both tangible and intangible.101  Being white 
itself reflected an identity that signified one’s status in law and social 
practice.  While “white” marked one as inherently free and unsaved, 
“black” denoted one as being subject to enslavement.102  White racial 
identity and the privileged position that it inhabits invokes a property 
interest with expectations that “could not be permissibly intruded 
upon without consent.”103 The ability to hold and possess property, 
rather that being its subject, demonstrates the crucial aspect of 
racialized property interests; the absence of blackness allowed for an 
unencumbered legal existence.104  Even after the slavery regime had 
fallen, people of African descent continued to feel the legal echoes of 
slave status.  
This Article takes up where Harris stops.  By taking seriously her 
claim that whiteness is property, it is possible to see property interests 
and racial privilege merge without subtlety in testamentary disputes. 
As Harris explains the expectation interest inherent in property 
theory, whiteness “retain[s] its essential exclusionary character…and 
distort[s] outcomes of legal disputes.” White collateral heirs meant 
for disinheritance by the testor jumped upon the opportunity to 
leverage their racial identity against beneficiaries of color.   As both a 
first and a last resort, whiteness kept property within the “proper” 
family while serving as a trump card to defeat interracial transfers. 
From this assumption of entitlement emerges a triangulation of race, 
sex, and property that underscored the implicit association of 
whiteness and legitimacy. 
 
II. Race as a Marker of Testamentary Eligibility 
 
Paul Remley, a free white man, died in Charleston in 
November of 1860.105  He left his widow, Mary Remley, a farm in 
Pennsylvania consisting of “19.5 acres of poor land but healthy with 
                                                     
100 Id. at 1728. 
101 Harris argues that “property is a legal construct by which selected private 
interests are protected and upheld.” Id. at 1730. 
102 Ida 1718. 
103 Ida 1731.  
104 Ida 1721. 
105 Account of Paul Remley’s Estate in Pennsylvania, Paul Remley Estate Case 
Records, 0308.02 (R) 01, South Carolina Historical Association (hereinafter 
“RCSCHS”) 
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two small storm houses on it, no farm buildings, one old shed.”106  
He appointed his son, Paul Durbin Remley (“Durbin”) as 
administrator of the estate, and the younger Remley assumed charge 
on December 1, 1860.107  In the following summer of 1861, Durbin 
filed for a grant of administration of his father’s will.  In this 
capacity, he was expected to share the profits of the estate with his 
siblings: Elizabeth Hubbell (née Remley) and Emma Remley.  At 
this time, the siblings lived in different parts of the country, with 
Durbin residing in Charleston and the sisters in Pennsylvania.  
The conflict within this family fluidly illustrates how external 
pressures simultaneously threaten and bolster their legitimacy as a 
family.  In two separate will contests involving the father Paul’s will 
and the younger son Durbin’s will, the racial identity of the 
beneficiaries determined the outcome.  Depending on the angle, law 
acts both to exclude and include, and the legitimacy of heirship turns 
on a secure claim to whiteness.  For those actors who were able to 
claim a legal identity as white, they employed law to restrict the 
economic benefits of family membership to exclude those who could 
not. 
 
A. Slavery and Testation 
 
1.  Strategic Accusations of Slavery 
 
A conflict arose when Durbin applied for the grant on June 
3, 1861—the same day that a challenger questioned his legitimacy as 
an administrator.  Mary Shrine, claiming to be his second cousin, 
filed a complaint in a Charleston Court of Ordinary alleging herself 
to be a legitimate next of kin.108  Durbin and his sisters, she alleged, 
were rendered ineligible due to the status of their mother.  Mrs. 
Shrine filed an affidavit which argued that “the supposed widow of 
Paul Remley is a colored person” and that “she was purchased by 
said Paul Remley as a slave.”109  Shrine attempted to position herself 
as having not only a superior claim on the estate, but as the only 
legitimate heir to the Remley estate.  If she proved the widow Mary 
                                                     
106 Id. 
107 Letter from William Hubbell (Aug 8, 1866) (RCSCHS) (hereinafter “W. 
HUBBELL, AUG. 8”).  
108 In the matter of Estate Paul Remley Dec’d (18 June 1861) (RCSCHS).  
109 Id. 
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as a slave, then the Remley children would follow her diminished 
status; Paul, Elizabeth, and Emma would immediately become 
slaves110, and ineligible to stand as legal heirs.111 Shrine, remaining as 
the nearest kin eligible to inherit (i.e. free and white), could 
overcome the articulated testatementary interests of Paul Remley’s 
children and widow.112 
The taint of slavery as the kryptonite of testation could 
render any “white” heir ineligible.  Mary Shrine based her argument 
on South Carolina’s 1841 Act to Prevent the Emancipation of Slaves.113  
This Act prohibited testamentary emancipations, and it also voided 
all bequests to slaves.  Section IV reads, “That every devise or 
bequest, to a slave or slaves, or to any person, upon a trust or 
confidence, secret or expressed, for the benefit of any slave or slaves, 
shall be null and void.”114  Even if the Remleys had considered 
themselves free white persons, the possibility of a hidden condition 
of their mother threatened their ability to inherit their father’s estate.   
 
2. Defending Whiteness 
 
The accusation of diminished legal and racial status, however 
farfetched, generated a flurry of representations of Remley family 
                                                     
110 Legal definitions of children’s status throughout the South followed Roman law 
by declaring partus sequitur ventrem—that children followed the condition of the 
mother. Wikramanayake, supra note 
111 A number of fictional books appealed to this white fear—of sudden and 
unexpected relegation to slavery.  In his meticulous book on mulatto imagery in 
Victorian fiction, ROBERT MENCKE, MULATTOES AND RACE MIXTURE 198 (1979) 
explains, “what threat could be more dire than that of the blood of the inferior 
races of the world secretly slipping into that of the mighty civilizing race of Anglo-
Saxons?”  Examples of such books are REBECCA HARDING DAVIS, WAITING FOR 
THE VERDICT (1867); ALBION TOURGEE, PACTOLUS PRIME (1890); WILLIAM 
DEAN HOWELLS, AN IMPERATIVE DUTY (1892); .  
112 It must be pointed out, however, that race did not serve as a constant 
determinant of status.  For children with parents of different races, the mother 
could be black or mulatto and pass her free status to her child.  Likewise, children 
of black or mulatto slave fathers and free white women, while very few in number, 
retained free status, despite their father’s condition.  EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL 
JORDAN ROLL (1976).  
113 Act to Prevent the Emancipation of Slaves, and for Other Purposes (1841), quoted in 
Joliffe v. Fanning & Phillips, 31 S.C. Eq. (10 Rich.Eq.) 186, 190 (1856); See also 
DAVIS, supra note 15 at 251. 
114 Id. 
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history.  The competing claims to the status of Mary Remley, who 
offered no voice in the available correspondence, demonstrate a 
flurry of legal panic in the race to reassert the primacy of whiteness 
and freedom.  If the Remley children followed the condition of their 
mother, not only would they lose testamentary and legal standing, 
but also their public reputations as free white persons.      
In an effort to bolster their legitimacy, the Remleys offered 
testimony from “respectable” white persons to verify their freedom 
and race. These narrative contributions necessarily referred to the 
past, offering a subjective view of Mary Remley’s standing in the 
community.  These acts of remembering had legal and practical 
relevance, but they also reasserted the Remley family as white, 
privileged citizens.  In reconstructing their racial identity by means of 
community opinion, the family followed a well-established 
precedent.  Whether these claims were made public outside the 
protection of the court remains unknown, but the singular assertion 
and multiple refutations as documented in the legal records 
commemorate a type of juridical discussion of sexual and racial 
privacy that was routinely relegated beyond the scope of public 
discourse.   
The Remley “defendants,” like any party in litigation, 
selectively remembered advantageous facts and omitted pejorative 
ones.  Soon after the supposed cousin filed the accusatory affidavit in 
the Court of Ordinary, the Remley party called upon Sam Wagner, a 
free white man and a churchgoing citizen of Charleston, to verify 
Mrs. Remley’s whiteness.  As a member of Bethel Methodist 
Church, Mr. Wagner testified that Mr. and Mrs. Remley were 
“always recognized as white persons in the use of all the privileges of 
the Church”115  He continues by attesting to their status as 
“acceptable members” and active “Class Leaders.”  Unmentioned in 
this written testimony are references to miscegenation or slavery.  
Mr. Wagner’s narrative limits itself to public interpretations of racial 
identity.  As expected, he makes no mention of Mrs. Remley’s 
questionable origins, focusing instead on Mr. Remley’s secure status 
as a free white man and Mrs. Remley’s white father.  Additionally, 
he remains silent on the Church’s significant black and mulatto 
                                                     
115 Affidavit of Sam Wagner (June 27, 1861) (RCSCHS). 
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members, who at that time constituted the majority of Charleston’s 
black Methodists, approximately 6,000 in number.116 
Characterizing the allegation as a “question of Pedigree and 
legitimacy,”117 the Court of Ordinary postponed the decision of grant 
in order to accommodate the contestant Mrs. Shrine by allocating 
one week for her to provide corroborating testimony.    When she 
failed to prove the slavery claim, the Court found Durbin legally 
competent to administer his father’s estate.  In the absence of 
supporting evidence from Mrs. Shrine regarding the truth of her 
accusation, Wagner’s sole opposing affidavit proved sufficient to 
defeat the objection to Durbin’s grant of administration.   The Court 
qualified this ruling, however, by distinguishing legitimacy for 
administration from legitimacy for distribution.  Noting that the 
possible truth of Shrine’s claim would not greatly affect the pending 
grant, the Court added “altho it may become so in a progress of 
settlement of assets of said Estate.”118 
Legally, the Court’s finding voided the issue, but the family 
continued to discuss the “great annoyance and mortification.”119  In 
correspondence and memoranda, Elizabeth Hubbell continued to 
refute the claims of race and slavery, writing from Philadelphia to 
her brother Durbin “a very long epistle” chronicling their family’s 
history of respectability and whiteness.120  Mrs. Hubbell’s pride 
prevents her from explicitly addressing the assault to her family’s 
racial identity, telling her brother that “the astonishment the thing 
has occasioned may be better imagined than described.”121  To her 
knowledge, their father was “not the man to lower himself by such a 
degrading act as is alleged.”122  She viewed these charges as a 
“conspiracy” organized by “low people” who unjustifiably wanted to 
deprive the Remley children of their inheritance.  In desperation, 
Hubbell expressed her conviction that the “whole thing [was] gotten 
up by some of [Durbin’s] enemies,” notwithstanding the 
                                                     
116 EDWARD LILLY ED., HISTORIC CHURCHES OF CHARLESTON 43-44 (Charleston, 
1966). 
117 In Court of Ordinary (June 29, 1861) (RCSCHS).  
118 Id. 
119 Letter from Elizabeth Hubbell to Paul D. Remley (July 7, 1861) (RCSCHS) 
(hereinafter “E. HUBBELL LETTER”). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
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“[un]intelligent” Mrs. Shrine whose “Mother was subject to some 
sort of fits.”123 
 
B. Reconstructing Whiteness  
 
Elizabeth Hubbell takes an adversarial stance in her letters, 
which makes these documents a source of critical interpretation. In 
writing she expressed her racial frustrations, while advocating her 
biased conception of her family’s racial identity.  Looking backward 
to the past for explanation, she draws upon unquestioned 
relationships to justify her own self-identity and that of her mother.  
She becomes the architect of her family’s history by realigning the 
past to justify her present needs.  Even if Hubbell’s labor of 
remembering finds ground in unstable sources, she appropriates a 
verisimilitude to her past that may be at odds with historical truths.124  
In this battle of competing whitenesses, each party expects their legal 
rights to follow the privileged condition of their racial identity.  
Three primary examples of lived whiteness form her grounds 
for remembering her family as white.  First, she recalls that her 
mother was registered at the multiracial Bethel Methodist Church in 
Charleston as a “free white person,” a demonstrative fact which she 
interprets as conclusive proof. 125   “[H]ad there been any doubt of the 
fact,” she writes, “I imagine her name could not have been entered 
there.”126  Second, her mother’s wedding to her father at Bethel serves 
as proof of their supposedly irreproachable whiteness.  She maintains 
that her mother’s bridesmaids were “ladies of respectability” who 
would not be “intimate with a person of doubtful pretensions.” Her 
                                                     
123 Id. 
124 See generally, W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE ED., WHERE THESE MEMORIES GROW: 
HISTORY, MEMORY AND SOUTHERN IDENTITY 5 (Chapel Hill, 2000). 
125 Her reliance on the church’s record of its members does not account for the 
possibility of errors in representation, similar to simple and learned mistakes of 
census takers.  Oftentimes, census takers and other keepers of official records 
make erroneous estimates of a person’s race, thus recording some African-
Americans of fair complexion as “white.”  In sole reliance upon these subjective 
measures of record-keeping for posterity, genealogists, historians, and other 
scholars may draw fatuous conclusions that have substantial effects on 
contemporary interpretations of racial identity.  For an insightful interpretation of 
this problem, see Kennedy, supra note 78 at 1-12 (chronicling the events of Green v. 
City of New Orleans). 
126 E. HUBBELL LETTER, supra note 119. 
KEVIN NOBLE MAILLARD (SYRACUSE) 
Color of Testamentary Freedom 
 
19  
logic assumes an if/then calculation that makes reputation a 
barometer of racial identity: “If she had been purchased and held as a 
slave all these things could not have been.”127  Lastly, she turns to her 
mother’s parentage and upbringing, noting that her mother’s mother 
was an orphan, “brought up by strangers.”128  Her mother’s father, of 
Jacksonboro, South Carolina, “was of a respectable family, scarcely 
likely to intermarry with a low person.”129  In each of these specious 
arguments, Elizabeth blindly accepts a tautology of race and 
reputation that equates “respectability” with whiteness and freedom 
and “doubtful pretensions” with blackness and slavery.130 
Elizabeth’s letter to her brother assumed a candid tone, 
revealing potentially shameful family intimacies.  She did not intend 
for it to be used in a court of law—rather she vented her personal 
frustrations into a written narrative that memorializes her shock, 
                                                     
127 ID. 
128 Elizabeth Hubbell’s husband William rushed to his wife’s defense by 
composing a memorandum to his attorney that traced the ancestry of his wife’s 
mother.  William Hubbell, Memorandum for James B. Campbell Esq. In the 
Matter of the Estate of Paul Remley, Deceased, on behalf of his widow Mary 
Remley & Children, written in 1861, but not sent “on account of hostilities 
preventing.”  (document not shared until November 9, 1886)  (RCSCHS) 
(hereinafter “W. HUBBELL MEMO”.  He too employed an equation of race and 
reputation to dismiss Shrine’s claims.  Polite white persons marry and consort with 
persons like themselves.  Mrs. Remley married a decent white man, and kept 
company with proper white Charlestonians.  Therefore, Mrs. Remley must be 
white.  He fortifies this logic with genealogical information about her parents 
Thomas and Leah Whitley, offering additional evidence to his wife’s rendition.  
Thomas Whitley, he argues, came from an English family of “respectable noble 
descent,” which he attests to be listed in Burke’s Peerage of Landed Gentry. See generally 
BURKE'S GENEALOGICAL AND HERALDIC HISTORY OF THE LANDED GENTRY 
(L.G. Pine ed. 1952)  Leah, on the other hand, he portrays as a daughter of a fallen 
soldier of the Revolutionary War and a woman of unknown origins.  Remarkably, 
he does not question any deeper meaning or possibility of “unknown.”  Still, this 
liaison of high and low, noble and plebian produced “an exemplary moral and 
Christian woman” who with her husband, operated a well-known grocery store in 
Charleston.  
129 E. HUBBELL LETTER, supra note 119. 
130 William Hubbell (spouse of Elizabeth) offers a radically different explanation 
for Mrs. Remley’s alleged status.  He surmises that a love triangle spawned the 
accusation of Mary Remley’s mother as a “colored slave.”  Apparently, Leah 
Whitley jilted Joseph Mitchell, who in turn married Mary Mitchell, the informant. 
W. HUBBELL, AUG. 8, supra note 107.  Embittered by a prolonged two years of 
rejection, Mitchell maliciously told others that Leah was a “colored slave.” 
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pain, and disbelief in the fragility of her racial identity.  Both 
Elizabeth and her husband William created lively renditions of the 
Remley past in order to protect their testamentary legitimacy.  It 
seems that Mrs. Shrine’s claim never penetrated the veil of 
believability for either the Court or the Remleys, but her farfetched 
claim provides an illuminating script to analyze the use of race as a 
qualifier of standing for inheritance.131  It also demonstrates the 
extent that courts would entertain such a testimony in patent 
opposition to the elder Remley’s intent.  Freedom of testation would 
fail in the event of a legitimate claim of slavery.   Knowing this, Mrs. 
Shrine floated on the presumption of the incompatibility of blackness 
and exclusion. 
 
 
                                                     
131 Harris at 1741; Jones, supra note 31 at 701.  
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III. Race and the Limits of Family 
 
The authority to contest a will directly relates to one’s status 
within the law.  Those who enjoy the legal privileges of property—in 
this case, the security of whiteness, enter a will contest on the 
offensive.  The younger Paul Remley (Durbin), disinherited his white 
family in Pennsylvania upon his death in 1863, devising his South 
Carolina estate to a black woman and their two children. In this 
subsequent case, the Pennsylvania family assumed the role of white 
collateral heirs, in sharp contrast to their role as besieged and 
presumed slaves.  At this point, they became unassaibly white. 
Although Durbin’s choice of family became quite apparent in his 
will, the South Carolina Equity Court resisted recognition of this 
nonmarital, interracial unit.   Again, freedom of testation hinged on 
the racial identity of the beneficiaries.  The Hubbell-Remleys, as 
legitimate and white collateral heirs, challenged the will which 
acknowledged interracial sexuality.  Durbin’s nontraditional devises 
did not convince the court that probating the will was morally 
justifiable.132   
Apparently, Durbin lived a quiet life as a wealthy planter in 
the Carolina Lowcountry.  Few, if any, texts of state history record 
his name as a prominent figure in Southern politics, agricultural 
affairs, or Charleston society.   At the time he applied to administer 
his father’s will in 1861, he lived on a plantation known as Remley’s 
Point in the Charleston District.  On this 305 acre plot situated in 
Christ Church Parish at the junction of the Cooper and Wando 
Rivers,133 Paul D. Remley lived with his slave Philis134 and their two 
                                                     
132 LESLIE at 236. 
133 Historical Overview of the 4th Avenue Tract, Remleys Point. (on file with the 
Avery Research Center for African American Culture, College of Charleston).   
134 No official bill of purchase exists for the slave Philis, but census records loosely 
provide an understanding of who she was.  The 1870 census lists both her and 
Cecile as “black” rather than “mulatto,” so we may assume that Philis and her 
daughter were of sufficiently dark complexion as to lead the census taker to 
classify them as of unmixed blood.     In 1861, she would have been approximately 
18 years old, the mother of a seven-year old son Charles, and pregnant with her 
daughter Cecile. The 1870 federal census lists Philis, black, as 27 years old, and 
Cecile, black, as seven.  However, litigation documents in 1866 verify Cecile being 
five years old.  These records would also make her a mother at age 12.  (on file 
with the Charleston County Public Library, South Carolina History and Genealogy 
Section).   
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children.  Durbin also owned a brick house and lot135 on Society 
Street in downtown Charleston, which was a common practice for 
wealthy planters in the Carolina Lowcountry.136  State records show 
that he bought and sold slaves fairly regularly.137  
Interracial sex and cohabitation existed in the antebellum 
South within unspoken codes of behavior.   Durbin could maintain 
Philis and their children at his plantation with impunity because her 
slave status eviscerated any claim of legitimacy on their sexual 
relationship.  As the slave mistress of Paul D. Remley, she tacitly 
assumed the role of wife and paramour, as he remained unmarried 
throughout his life.  As the mother of his only two children, Philis 
claimed a distinct role at Remley’s Point.  Nominally a slave but 
almost a wife, she assumed an ambiguous role of partner and servant 
not unknown to women of color in the antebellum South.138  Even 
though South Carolina law allowed for interracial marriage139, it 
applied to free blacks only, thus preventing the legal legitimization of 
miscegenous relationships between master and slave.  Slavery 
precluded any legally recognized relationships, thus securing the 
                                                     
135 He also owned two uninhabited lots in Charleston.  See Plan Showing 16 Town 
Lots On Anson, Society, East Bay And Wentworth Streets, Surveyed By Charles 
Parker, Series L10005, Reel  0001, Plat 00493 (on file with South Carolina Dept. of 
Archives and History). 
136 See generally EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE 
SLAVES MADE 427 (New York, 1976) (discussing Charleston’s development as a 
cosmopolitan center for the plantation aristocracy). 
137 See George Henry to Paul Remley, Bill of Sale For a Slave Named Amey, 
Series S213003, Vol. 005D, p. 0001 (Sept 9, 1820) (on file with the South Carolina 
Dept. of Archives and History);  Paul Remley To Thomas Buller King of St. 
Simons Island, Ga., Bill of Sale For a Slave Named Limehouse, by Trade a 
Bricklayer, Series S213003, Vol. 005K, p. 00314 (Nov. 17, 1830) (on file with the 
South Carolina Dept. of Archives and History) 
138  The question of emotion and intimacy in interracial relations in the South, 
particularly between white men and black slave women, has received great 
attention in many disciplines, with no agreement on how to characterize them.  I 
certainly do not intend to address that contentious issue, seeing that it goes beyond 
the scope of this project.  Other scholars, however, offer meticulous historical 
studies.  See generally JOSHUA ROTHMAN, NOTORIOUS IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD: 
SEX AND FAMILIES ACROSS THE COLOR LINE IN VIRGINIA, 1787-1861 (Chapel 
Hill, 2003); F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK: ONE NATION’S DEFINITION 
(Pennsylvania State University, 2001);  MARTHA HODES, WHITE WOMEN, BLACK 
MEN: ILLICIT SEX IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH (New Haven, 1999); 
GENOVESE, supra note 136. 
139 See, supra note  
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sexual freedom of white men.  Furthermore, Durbin and Philis did 
not challenge what Adrienne Davis has termed the Southern “sexual 
economy”140 by formally affirming their relationship with the state.  
In this choice, Durbin faithfully believed that recorded word would 
suffice in the distribution of his estate.  
Testator appreciation for wills—their ritual, the solemnity, 
the gravity—incorrectly assumes that death solidifies intended 
posthumous transfers, thus following the common law aspiration of 
freedom of testation.141  This doctrine would doggedly argue for the 
careful distribution of property as the decedent saw fit, in accordance 
with a validly drawn, witnessed, and executed will.142  Far too often, 
courts and collateral heirs ignore testamentary language to 
reformulate a will that more closely conforms to state-mandated 
schemes of distribution.  The color of testamentary freedom defeats 
donative intent to reapportion the estate for the unintended benefit of 
related, but clearly undesirable heirs.   
 
A. “Die and endow, a college or a cat” 
Yet Durbin would show his appreciation for this relationship 
upon his death.  He died on December 25, 1863 while hunting, 
which Philis describes in a letter as “the discharge of his Gun by 
shooting marsh hens in company with Major Bolks and John Antley 
the ball entered his lungs of which he survived 13 days after being 
shot[.]”143  In his will, he provided for his slave-widow and their 
children an annuity of $500 per year, to be paid from the sales of his 
property both real and personal.144  He also bequeathed “his 
Negroes,” meaning Philis, Charles, and Cecile, to a friend “to have 
the labor and services of the said slaves and their issue for and during 
his natural life.”145  Durbin did not intend to relegate his family to a 
state of abject slavery, but to place them “under the control of kind 
and indulgent owners, who will, whenever the law permits manumit 
and make them free.”146   
                                                     
140 DAVIS, supra note 15 at 228. 
141 Leslie at 235 (“Courts and scholars often treat freedom of testation as if it were 
a fundamental tenet of our liberal legal tradition.”) 
142 Id. at 345.  
143 Letter from Philis to Elizabeth Hubbell (June 1, 1865) (RCSCHS). 
144 Paul D. Remley Will, Remley’s Point Collection, available at Avery Research 
Center for African American History and Culture, College of Charleston. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
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South Carolina courts frequently tried such issues.  In Fable & 
Franks v. Brown, a white man established a trust in his will for his two 
“illegitimate coloured children by a female slave.”147  The plaintiffs, 
claiming to be the next of kin of the testator, objected to the will, 
claiming that such bequests to slaves were invalid.  On appeal, the 
court approved the bequest on its face, upholding the testator’s 
wishes.  As a caveat, however, the court compared the man’s will to 
the freedom of providing posthumous support for a favorite pet or 
object, saying, “Die and endow, a college or a cat.”148  Even though 
the court validated the will, the property reverted to the state, 
because slaves, as property, could not inherit.   
Durbin’s scheme differs, however, because of timing, thus 
allowing circumvention of the legal prohibition on slave bequests 
and manumissions.  He did not leave his property to his slave family 
directly, but to an administrator to carry out his wishes.  In this 
testamentary trust, his family would receive the interest resulting 
from the state of his personal property that he could not leave to 
them directly because they were slaves.149 Additionally, he did not 
manumit the slaves in his will, but he allowed for its possibility in the 
future, but at the time of probate, this issue was moot.  Had the will 
been executed while Phillis and the children remained slaves, the 
court may have followed Fable. 
Durbin’s semantics of slavery in his will deserves further 
scrutiny.  Although Philis argues that she and her children had been 
emancipated by the time he wrote his will, he nevertheless referred to 
them as though they were slaves.  Had he left them property directly, 
he would have placed their interests in jeopardy considering that the 
1841 prohibition on slave bequests had yet to be overturned.150  
                                                     
147 Fable & Franks v. Brown, 10 S.C. Eq. (1 Hill Eq.) 378, 379 (1835). 
148 Id. at 397. 
149 See supra note 113. 
150 The clause reads,  
Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives, now met and sitting in 
General Assembly, and by the authority of the same, That any bequest, deed of 
trust, or conveyance, intended to take effect after the death of the owner, whereby 
the removal of any slave or slaves, without the limits of this State, is secured or 
intended, with a view to the emancipation of such slave or slaves, shall be utterly 
void and of no effect, to the extent of such provision; and every such slave so 
bequeathed, or otherwise settled or conveyed, shall become assets in the hands of 
any executor or administrator, and be subject to the payment of debts, or to 
KEVIN NOBLE MAILLARD (SYRACUSE) 
Color of Testamentary Freedom 
 
25  
Additionally, he did not free them in the will, but he expressed the 
hope that their new owners would manumit them “whenever the law 
permits.”151  Although the Emancipation Proclamation affected 
many states, it did not necessarily free all slaves in South Carolina, 
and all slaves, regardless of residence, were freed by the 13th 
Amendment in 1865.152  In referring to them as slaves, Durbin 
captures a memory of them as favored and faithful servants instead 
of beloved and deserving family members.  In this move, he formally 
maintains distance between himself and Philis, thus underscoring a 
Southern code of racial propriety.   
Durbin’s goodwill toward his black family makes a strong 
statement as to his parental allegiances. Although he does not 
acknowledge his children as his blood, his testamentary wishes 
clearly state his economic concerns for his family, and he 
memorializes his intimacy with Philis in a legal document that leaves 
little room for alternative explanations.  He expressed a desire to sell 
his property “to be appropriated for the use, clothing and comfort in 
sickness and health” for her and the children.153 In this document, he 
rejects the interests of his collateral white heirs, which he noticeably 
refrains from mentioning until the end of the will.  In this devise, he 
leaves his residual estate to his mother Mary Remley, and upon her 
death to his sister Emma.  In no place in the will does he mention his 
sister Elizabeth Hubbell.  
                                                     
distribution amongst the distributees or next of kin, or to escheat, as though no 
such will or other conveyance had been made. 
See supra note 113. 
151 Paul D. Remley Will, supra note 144. 
152 At the time of Durbin’s death, President Lincoln had issued the Emancipation 
Proclamation, which declared that “all persons held as slaves…shall be then, 
thenceforward, and forever free[.]”  ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Emancipation 
Proclamation (January 1, 1863) in 6 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 
28-31 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).  This decree most likely did not change Philis’s 
slave status, as South Carolina remained a rebellious state that resisted actual 
emancipation until the physical arrival of Union troops. LARRY KOGER, BLACK 
SLAVEOWNERS: FREE BLACK SLAVEMASTERS IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1790-1860 
190 (1985).  The possibility of the exceptional change in her status would have 
entangled Durbin’s will in a problematic archaism—he made provisions for slave 
succession after emancipation and these promises found no political or legal 
grounding.  Possibly freed, but indicated as slaves in the will, Durbin’s legacy to 
Philis, Charles, and Cecile, as a post-emancipation testament, made itself 
vulnerable to attack. 
153 Id. 
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Durbin disinherited his sisters because he found their 
opinions of his family objectionable.  Elizabeth’s previous letter 
regarding their mother’s racial identity revealed strong disapproval of 
race mixing, which she described as “degrading” and “low.”   In 
finding a subject to channel her frustrations and convictions, she 
demonstrates her disapproval of miscegenation to her brother 
without explicit mention of his own transgressions.   
The Remley case stands apart from other interracial 
inheritance cases because of the prevalent influence of the Civil War.  
Durbin’s will remained untouched for three years after his death, 
which coincides with the war’s end.  Presumably, hostilities between 
the Union and the Confederacy deterred not only the rapid 
administration of wills, but also communications between North and 
South.  Correspondence amongst multiregional families such as the 
Remley’s dissipated to such an extent that years passed without 
hearing news from relatives in distant places. This case is no 
exception, and postwar letters circulated amongst the family 
demonstrate delayed notifications of salient events.  In the period 
between Durbin’s death and the subsequent litigation, the 
transformations of war raise this standard yet mildly transgressive 
postmortem distribution to a juridical exercise of reconstructing the 
past.  
Correspondence from Charleston completes the cycle of 
belated information about uncommunicated family episodes.  As 
proxy for Durbin, Philis responds to the sisters on June 1, 1865, with 
her own tragic news of Durbin’s death.  In this response, she conveys 
a sense of loneliness, despair, and depression.  Philis’s letter sparks a 
chain of events that leads to the eventual dispute over inheritance.  In 
this correspondence, she conveys an intimacy with Durbin that 
alludes to mutual intimacy.  A full two years after his death, she 
recalls:  
My Dear Mistress the morning of which he died 
was Christmas on that Morning he Called me to 
wash him saying that he felt so much better and said 
that he did not think that his mother was alive and 
was Desirous of seeing his sisters also he said on the 
Morning that Christmas Morning was a Mourning 
Day to the Family which after he called on me to 
give Him the Bible to read of which I did & said that 
KEVIN NOBLE MAILLARD (SYRACUSE) 
Color of Testamentary Freedom 
 
27  
he was thankful to God for his Mercies towards Him 
to spare his life to see that happy Morning[.]154 
 
This candid vignette shows intimacy between Durbin and Philis 
that she relays without hesitation to his two white sisters.  Philis 
nevertheless remains deferential and observant in her writing by 
repeatedly referring to Durbin as “My Dear Master,” but she also 
conveys her attachment to him by eventually admitting “you do not 
know how it destroyed me” and that “I truly Miss him.”155  At the 
close of her letter, she pleads for the sisters to return to Charleston 
“to relieve [her] Distressing mind” and to “find a Friend.”  The 
exercise of recalling her beloved’s death renewed the pain she once 
felt, as she laments, “I would say more but by heart ache me to think 
of the past or look at the present.”156 
  
B. Race-ing to a Will Contest  
 
Durbin’s will serves as intriguing memoranda of a socially averted 
yet physically manifested chapter of slaveholding society.  Yet this 
case turns that silence on its head.  In re Remley does not stand alone 
by any means—other cases in South Carolina exemplify the not 
uncommon practice of miscegenation and concomitant testamentary 
expressions of compassion.157  The law’s resistance to testatementary 
diversity demonstrates the existence of a “problem” that could not be 
avoided.  The transfer of property and wealth from white to black 
memorializes the testator’s preference to designate these goods in the 
interests of his mixed race family.  This deliberate act of prioritizing 
the economic interests of his black family invites a public 
postmortem discussion of miscegenation that in his lifetime, 
remained purely private.  In this act, he calls upon law to investigate, 
                                                     
154 Letter from Philis, supra note 143. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 See also Somers v. Smyth. 2 S.C. Eq. (2 Des. Eq.) 214 (1803); Miller v. Mitchell, 8 
S.C. Eq. (Bail. Eq.) 428 (1831); Fable and Franks v. Brown, 10 S.C. Eq. (1 Hill Eq.) 
290 (1835); Farr v. Thompson, 25 S.C. Eq. (4 Rich.Eq.) 37 (1839); Carmile v. Carmile 
16 S.C. Eq. (McMul. Eq.) 635 (1842); Monk v. Pinckney, 30 S.C. Eq. (9 Rich.Eq.) 
279 (1857); Dougherty v. Executors of Doughtery, 21 S.C. Eq. (2 Strob. Eq.) 63 (1848); 
Ford, Escheator v. Dangerfield, 29 S.C. Eq. (8 Rich.Eq.) 95 (1856); Jolliffe v. Fanning & 
Phillips, 31 S.C.Eq. (10 Rich.Eq.) 186 (1856). 
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affirm, and sustain the legitimacy of his subjective articulation of 
family.  Yet, within a racial regime that prioritized propriety over 
deviance, the question of whose interests are served challenges the 
lofty theory of testatmentary freedom.  
Counsel for the Hubbell’s contended that the will intended to spite 
Elizabeth and her mother by “putting the Negroes over” their 
interests.158  In this contest, the sisters objected to the will on three 
primary grounds: 1) that testamentary transfers to slaves were 
invalid; 2) that Durbin appropriated his father’s estate for his own 
use and enjoyment; and 3) that the postwar devaluation of Durbin’s 
estate deprived them of any interest in his property.   
 
1. The Slavery Claim 
 
The intention to establish a trust for Philis and the children 
immediately drew the attention of the Hubbell’s, who viewed them 
not as eligible parties for a testamentary transfer, but as bonded 
persons precluded from exercising legal and economic interests.159  A 
bill of complaint opposing Philis’s interest described the bequest as 
“contrary to Equity and good conscience.”160  This rebuttal draws 
upon a conception of the past that eternally equates blackness with 
slavery.   Even though Durbin wrote his will after Lincoln’s 
emancipation of Philis and the children, common sense would 
dictate that the Hubbell’s’ slavery claim found no legitimate ground.  
Still, Elizabeth and her husband persisted to contest Durbin’s intent 
to provide for and support his chosen family; they saw not a family 
but a gang of slaves that threatened their free and racialized interest 
in his estate.   
Their focus on the slave status of Philis and her children 
demonstrates the Hubbell’s’ racially motivated objections, and they 
rely on race privilege as a persuasive method for denying the validity 
of the will.  They do not deny the existence of the miscegenous 
relationship, as their correspondence demonstrates this knowledge.  
Because they did not directly attack Philis and her children’s racial 
status as impediments to inheritance, the slavery argument displaces 
this expected rebuttal by fixating on their former lives as slaves.  
Presumably, the Hubbell’s realized the weakness of this objection to 
                                                     
158 Unsigned memo to Messrs. Ledyard and Boulon (Nov 9, 1866) (RCSCHS). 
159 Id. 
160 Ziba B. Oakes Bill of Complaint (Nov. 9, 1866) (RCSCHS). 
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the will, seeing that its postwar execution and contestation dates 
made the slavery issue almost moot.  Only under Confederate law 
could this claim have succeeded.   
Philis readily responded to this fatuous claim by asserting her 
rights gained as a free woman.  In her answer to the Hubbell’s’ 
complaint, she insisted upon the validity of the will, emphasizing its 
creation after her manumission.  Arguing for its possible validity 
under the regime of slavery, she emphasized that “having been 
actually emancipated and made free before the distribution of the 
estate of Paul D. Remley such bequest should be held good and 
valid.”161  On the strength of this claim, she succeeded in establishing 
her ability to inherit property. 
 
2. Whether Durbin’s “Appropriation” was Proper 
 
Competing conceptions of the past reemerge in the 
interpretation of “property” of the elder Paul Remley’s estate.  As 
stated above, the Hubbell’s maintained that Philis and her children 
were ineligible to inherit as slaves, but they expanded this argument 
by also asserting that the slaves existed as part of the elder Remley’s 
estate.  In this line of thought, their father’s death entitled them to a 
share in the slave property, which they argued that Durbin 
“appropriated them to his own use and purposes.”162  They expected 
Durbin, once appointed as administrator of the estate, to convert the 
father’s personal property into money and divide the proceeds 
equally amongst the heirs.  Of this personal property, which William 
Hubbell estimated at $36,000, Elizabeth, Emma, and Durbin would 
each receive $12,000.163 
In the interest of securing a share in Durbin’s estate, the 
Hubbell’s appropriated the meaning of chattel slavery.  Here, they 
did not view Philis as a long-term acquaintance or fellow heir, but as 
merchandise which Durbin mishandled in the administration of his 
father’s estate.  Philis shifts from an article of property to an 
                                                     
161 Separate answer of Philis a freed woman, South Carolina District Court, In 
Equity (Dec. 28, 1866) (RCSCHS). 
162 W. HUBBELL LETTER, supra note 107 .  
163 Hubbell catalogues the personal property as: “about 30 negroes value $25 K 
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obstruction of right, one that displaces their expectation to 
inheritance.164  In other words, Durbin’s enumeration of Philis as a 
beneficiary rather than a parcel reduces the total value of the money 
they argued belonged to them.  
He says they are his slaves and then dispenses of 
their services as his own property to another person, 
exclusive of the other heirs—“expressis imicis alterias 
exclusis.”  If they as he says are taken as his and 
dispenses of by him as his then he excludes the other 
heirs and they can claim for value received by him.165 
Philis, they believed, was not exclusively Durbin’s.  Even though 
he called them “my negroes Philis and her children,”166 the Hubbells 
claimed they were theirs as well.  This way of remembering the past, 
although legally motivated, aims to diminish the status of Philis as a 
rightful beneficiary.  Even by invoking her monetary value, they 
cannot reasonably relegate her to slave status, but they can insist on 
recovering this money to aggrandize a greater share than Durbin had 
allotted.  Thus, in describing Philis as an object of property rather 
than its recipient, the white collateral heirs seek financial security 
through a shrewd manipulation of the past.  
 
3. The Devaluation of Durbin’s Estate 
 
The value of Durbin’s estate directly relates to the outcome 
of the Civil War.  He wrote his will after the war began, taking into 
account the then-current value of his property.  At that time, he 
considered his estate valuable enough to yield $500 a year for the 
comfort and clothing of Philis and her children.  Alternatively, he 
authorized his trustee James Gray to pay them the amount in full “if 
in his judgment he shall deem it judicious and proper.”167  This 
estimate of his finances and holdings predated the fall of the 
Confederacy and the collapse of its economy.  Durbin remained 
aware of the possible effects of the war, as he directed his executors 
to invest his money conservatively to safeguard his postmortem 
worth throughout the war.   He entrusted them to invest in “safe 
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Securities, or real estate…until the declaration of peace between 
these Confederate States and the United States[.]”168 
Durbin’s antebellum legacy to his black family, which would not 
take effect until after the war, makes an intriguing study of the 
influences of history on memory.  At once, the document 
encompasses three modes of temporality: past, present, and future, 
each intervening to construct, commemorate, and sustain posterity of 
interracial wealth marked by the mercurial economy of the embattled 
South.  When he wrote his will he remembered his property as he 
could only imagine—the economic upheaval of the agrarian based 
political system which supplied his wealth superseded his 
testamentary objectives.  As much as he tried to secure his property 
for Philis, he could not accurately account for the devaluation of his 
estate that would swallow his secondary bequests to his mother Mary 
and sister Emma.  From his standpoint, the subversive act of 
enriching the economic lives of his black kin would transcend his 
death.  In his own act of remembering and securing the past, he 
could not contemplate an unforeseen and unprecedented future.   
The Civil War’s effect on property values generated additional 
testimonies. His executor, Optimus Hughes, submitted an answer to 
the Equity Court that described the conditions of the estate in the 
aftermath of the Civil War.  Returning to Charleston after serving in 
the Confederate Army, Hughes found his papers and accounts 
destroyed.  He recalled the poor economic climate, saying that 
“everybody was oppressed with anxiety and great poverty scarcely 
knowing what to do to obtain food for their families.”169 
The disinherited Hubbells argued that the legacy to Philis and 
her children deprived them of their fair share in distribution.  
Objecting to the “fallacy of [Durbin’s] expectations,” they were not 
“willing to bear all the losses and give her the full measure of the 
legacy.”170  Here lies a problem of ademption as a result of interstate 
conflict.  In an 1866 memorandum to their attorneys, the Hubbells 
contended: 
But as to Durbin’s will it was made with the view that 
there would be no loss in the Estate—but under the 
Southern Confederacy would be valuable and that he 
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could afford to give her $500 a year on 8,000 or so 
absolutely out of his share—and have much left.171 
Their primary objection to Durbin’s will focuses not only on the 
devaluation, then, but also his misappropriation of property to which 
they felt entitled.  While the two sisters had moved north to 
Pennsylvania, Durbin remained in South Carolina, inhabiting the 
valuable plantation at Remley’s Point and the other properties in 
Charleston.  They believed that even if Durbin’s will did not make 
them primary beneficiaries, they deserved a share in their father’s 
estate, which they believed Durbin had hoarded for himself.  If his 
executors sold this property to provide for Philis, she would take 
“their” property. 
 
C. Testamentary Drama 
 
The performative aspect of will disputes surfaces in the courts, 
where competing conceptions of the past come forth.   Three parties 
offer different versions of what the testator intended to bequeath to 
the heirs:  First, the deceased party offers a written document as 
evidence of his intentions.  In this testamentary language, he outlines 
desired plans for the estate after his death in the presence of 
witnesses that can attest to its veracity.  Durbin, with three witnesses 
and an equal number of executors, constructed a plan to support his 
companion and their children beyond his death.  Second, the named 
beneficiary offers a similar conception of the past, and she persists in 
proving the will as legal and valid.  Philis insisted that Durbin, as the 
head of her household, earnestly intended for her entitlement to his 
estate.  As an explicitly listed distributee, she offers the will itself as 
proof of his unquestionable design.172  Lastly, the objectors to the will 
submit an alternative version of the true intention of the will, and 
they envision a radically different plan of distribution, which they 
argue as the appropriate version.  According to each of these parties, 
their version of the past stands as correct. 
But in litigation, multiple versions of the same story always exist.  
Without this conflict, the issue would become moot; unequal and 
unpleasant distributions would not occur, everyone would agree, and 
all would accede to a singular account of history.  As argued by Paul 
Antze and Michael Lambek, interpretive conventions greatly 
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influence the types of actors and events that receive attention, and 
also the kinds of evidence accepted as testaments to the past.173  The 
divisive and tumultuous factor of race institutes an additional 
narrative convention in recreating the past and viewing the family, 
and interracial conflicts aptly illustrate this interpretive diversity.  In 
interracial inheritance disputes, the color of testamentary freedom 
often allowed collateral heirs to deny the existence of mixed race.  In 
relying on a legal system that rewarded and prioritized the 
circumstance of whiteness, testators retained no assurance that their 
wishes would be carried out.174   
This case effectively demonstrates the color of testamentary 
freedom, and the vested property interest of whiteness. First, Mary 
Shrine could have jeopardized the Remelys' ability to inherit from 
their father’s estate if they were found to have African ancestry.  Mrs. 
Shrine could have limited the definition of legitimate family to those 
persons who could prove themselves white. Secondly, Durbin’s 
collateral heirs relied upon the racial privilege afforded them by law 
to deny Philis of a monetary legacy that would recognize and 
perhaps legitimate her own family. The likelihood of their surprise at 
the relationship between Durbin and Philis is low.  Yet, the fictional 
barricade that facilitated white denial in the face of blatant 
knowledge acted to deny people of color from taking part in the 
benefits accorded to legally recognized family members.175  
Durbin’s siblings indeed objected to the interracial will, as they 
appealed to the Equity Court to “cut the Negroes out entirely.”176 
They recognized that Durbin’s bequest to his black family was 
“sufficient to take up the whole of his interest in his father’s Estate 
and that there [was] nothing left for any other party.”177  By 
excluding his mistress and children, the sisters attempted to erase the 
recorded legacy that entitled former slaves, then current kin, to a 
share in Durbin’s estate.  William Hubbell wrote a letter advising his 
attorneys to “attack…the validity of the will itself” and to absorb all 
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of Durbin’s interest to “[leave] nothing for it to take effect upon.”178  
Their objections to the will, in addition to procuring additional 
wealth for themselves, stem from their displeasure with Durbin’s 
tenuous relationship with his white family.  They complained that 
Durbin “never wrote to them, nor sent anything during the 
Rebellion” and that “he never sent them a dollar.”179  Additionally, 
“he did not even send his Mother money to pay his Father’s funeral 
expenses.”180 
These letters of objection reveal a desire to reinvent a familial 
history devoid of the taint of miscegenation.  Hubbell writes that they 
wish to “undo what has been done,” explicitly rejecting the past that 
Durbin had memorialized in his will.181  In denying the testator’s 
death wishes, the collateral heirs recreate history in their own image, 
championing themselves as the legally and racially eligible 
distributees.  Despite the fact that Durbin’s wishes were recorded on 
paper and ratified by witnesses, the white tentative heirs retell a story 
of Durbin’s ill health, arguing that his disabled condition from the 
gun wound led him to write an invalid will.  Only “with a load of 
shot and wad in his lungs,” they argue, could they rationalize 
Durbin’s wishes to spite his family for a gaggle of slaves.182  
According to this line of thought, respectable white persons would 
not reasonably relinquish their property and wealth to bastards and 
Negroes.  
 Although the white collateral heirs’ depiction of Durbin’s 
infirmity and irresponsibility garnered sympathy from the Equity 
Court, they did not wholly attempt to derail Philis from her proper 
inheritance.  But this nominal inclusion must not be confused with 
accepting her as a legitimate distributee.  They recognized Philis not 
as part of Durbin’s family, but as a servant to their father who 
deserved compensation “in consideration of her attention…in his 
sickness at the Point two or three years before his death.”183  Seeing 
themselves as the primary heirs rather than Philis and her children, 
the white heirs agreed to allot $2,000 “for her comfort, when she as 
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things proceed proves worthy of it.” 184  In stark contrast to Durbin’s 
testamentary intent, Philis received a pittance while Elizabeth took 
the majority of his estate. The Equity Court Master approved this 
consolation scheme, recommending that “it be accepted as 
advantageous to [Philis].”185 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The conflict that instigated the Remley conflict escaped 
traditional legal methods of resolution.  The complex nature of the 
case required special attention that the courts of the common law 
could not adequately provide.  Due to the radical changes in the 
South’s political, economic, and legal climate caused by the Civil 
War, pertinent law that directly and fairly addressed the postwar 
administration of an antebellum interracial will did not exist.  
Moreover, probate of the will, so soon after the war, yet four years 
after the testator’s death, lingered in the postwar instability of South 
Carolina’s legal system. Ademption of Durbin’s estate hinged on 
whether or not Philis and the children could be considered a loss of 
“property” and also a misappropriation of the elder Remley’s estate.   
Yet, no slave system existed at the time of probate to fund the estate.  
Thus, South Carolina’s Equity Court heard the case because it did 
not fit into existing rules of law, administering a ruling with a 
heightened sensitivity to the individual interests of the parties.186  
This courtly invocation of empathy viewed the disinheritance of 
white heirs (in favor of black ones) as a viable application for 
equitable principles.   
This case, which spans both antebellum and postwar regimes, 
forces an examination of public secrets being legally recognized.  As 
Austin Sarat argues, “memory may be attached, or attach itself, to 
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law and be preserved in and through law.”187  This method of 
constructing the past in relation to the juridical structures particular 
to a place and time works to legitimate and authorize an historical 
account of possibilities and improbabilities.  This is a surprising 
result from a contemporary viewpoint.  To imagine that a former 
slave’s right to inheritance decreased after the Civil War confounds a 
modern understanding of historical memory.  It is far easier to 
imagine Philis’s chances of inheritance as secure after the war, but it 
is more difficult to interpret her diminishing rights after the domestic 
conflict that presumably attempted to enable them.  Furthermore, to 
examine her shrinking interest in Durbin’s estate in light of his 
testamentary wishes presents a peculiar definition of “equity.”  
While this translates to an overt assertion of racial supremacy in 
objection to clear testamentary intent, it also demonstrates a shrewd 
manipulation of legal definitions of family.  The Hubbells portray his 
effort as a wanton death desire of a country planter “with a load of 
shot and wad in his lungs.”188 
The claim of incapacity allows the collateral heirs to make 
legal sense of Durbin’s unconventional assertion of a multiracial 
family in the antebellum and postwar South.189 Yet, Durbin did not 
marry Philis, even though Philis was technically not a slave and state 
law permitted interracial marriages at the time of his death.  Had he 
married her, his siblings would not have had legal grounds to contest 
the will, and the combination of her free status and her spousal 
protection would have enabled her to inherit without restriction.  
Yet, South Carolina law enabled the white heirs to succeed in their 
will challenge because the legal system upheld the restricted notion 
of a white, legitimate, recognized family—which did not include 
Philis and the children. 
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State law resisted the probate of Durbin’s will as he intended.  His 
testamentary objective was clear—he wanted to provide for Philis 
and the children, and leave his sister with nothing.  The competing 
conceptions of family—his black one and his white one—find 
different treatments in South Carolina courts.  Even though he made 
provisions for Philis’s “use, clothing and comfort,” he could not 
overcome the legal privilege accorded to free whites.  His collateral 
heirs were able to capitalize upon the law’s favoring of free, white 
persons as a way of denying any recognition of Philis as a family 
member.  Moreover, the massive transformations stemming from the 
Civil War changed the composition of Durbin’s estate.  The Civil 
War, the Emancipation Proclamation, and the weakening of the 
southern plantocracy undermined Philis’s claim to her share of 
Durbin’s property.  He neither lived to see the economic devaluation 
of his property nor the legal wranglings that weakened his own 
family’s testamentary interests. He did not foresee that law would 
force his posthumous gifts toward the family that he wished to 
disinherit. These influences, in addition to the challenges presented 
by the Hubbells, precluded Philis, the rightful heir, from obtaining 
her due legacy.  
This historical failure of donative intent stifles the possibility of 
marginalized families to secure their due inheritance. Not limited to 
finances alone, law’s role in quashing the testator’s intent 
underscores a collective belief in the normativity of traditional 
families.  In this way, the larger legal system supports testamentary 
larceny in blatant contradiction to explicit legal language 
recognizing, promoting, and memorializing intimate connections 
between black and white.  Testamentary freedom, in all of its 
aspirational claims, means nothing in the face of a legal system 
rooted in the restrictive and damaging conformity of “legitimate” 
families.  In the case of the Remleys, Durbin’s “family” did not exist 
as a reality in a legal regime that defined intimacy in terms of black 
and white, with nothing in between.  
